Fee caps and bans in other claims markets

1Summary

A research credit claim is one of many settings in which an adviser helps a person or business claim money from a public scheme, and is sometimes paid a share of what is recovered. This paper looks at three other claims markets in which lawmakers or regulators have acted on fees calculated that way: claims management in the United Kingdom, the employee retention credit in the United States, and the disability tax credit in Canada. It also describes the limits that federal law already places on contingent fees for Social Security, veterans' benefits and federal tort claims.

The tools differ. The UK regulator capped fees as a percentage of redress with a cash maximum in each band.1 Canada replaced percentage fees with a flat maximum of $100 for each request.23 Congress, in 2025, used a fee based on the amount of the refund or credit as part of the test for who counts as an employee retention credit promoter, and attached a due diligence penalty.4 Older federal statutes cap the fee, require agency approval or bar any fee before an initial decision.567

The paper does not claim that any of these markets is the same as the research credit market, and it does not measure outcomes, because no official source found for this paper evaluates them against research credit claims. It describes what each government did and the reasons it gave. Swanson Reed's position on the federal research credit is stated once, in a labeled box.

2Why look at other claims markets

2.1What the markets have in common

In each market described here, three parties are involved: a person or business entitled to money from a public scheme, the government body or regulated firm that pays it, and an adviser who helps make the claim. In each, some advisers have charged a fee calculated as a share of the money recovered.

The federal research credit shares both features. A business claims the credit on its return or on a claim for refund, and IRS examiner guidance has described research credit refund claims as usually based on a study prepared by an outside consultant.8 Some advisers are paid a contingent fee, which Treasury's rules define to include a fee "based on a percentage of the refund reported on a return" or "of the taxes saved".9

2.2Where the analogy stops

The differences matter as much as the similarities. The UK and Canadian schemes described below pay individuals, mostly consumers or people with disabilities and their families, and their regulators framed their concerns around those claimants.1011 The research credit is claimed by businesses, which may be better placed than individual consumers to compare advisers and negotiate terms.

The second difference is who decides the amount. In a UK financial services complaint, a firm, an ombudsman or a compensation scheme decides the redress.10 In a Social Security or veterans' claim, the agency decides the past-due benefits before any fee is paid from them.56 The research credit is self-assessed: the amount on the return is the amount the taxpayer and its adviser calculate, and the IRS asks for the underlying detail if a claim is selected for examination.12 Treasury has cited that feature, the possibility of positions that "exploit the audit selection process", as a reason for restricting contingent fees on returns.13 The comparisons below should be read with that difference in mind.

3The United Kingdom: claims management fee caps

3.1Regulation and the statutory duty

Claims management companies help consumers bring complaints and claims, including claims for redress from financial services firms. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) took over their regulation in April 2019.14 The FCA explains that when Parliament legislated in 2018 to transfer that regulation, it gave the FCA a statutory duty under the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018 to make rules about the fees charged on claims about financial products and services "with a view to securing an appropriate degree of protection from excessive fees".10

The FCA consulted in January 2021 and published its final rules in Policy Statement PS21/18 in November 2021.10 The rules apply to claims under contracts entered into from 1 March 2022.14

3.2The cap

The cap applies to fees charged on most claims for monetary redress from a financial services firm, whether the redress is paid directly by the firm, through the Financial Ombudsman Service or through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.1410 Claims about payment protection insurance are outside it, because, in the FCA's words, they are "already subject to a 20% cap, set by Parliament".14

The cap for a claim is the lower of a maximum percentage of the redress and a maximum total charge, set by band.1

3.3Figure 1: the UK fee cap for financial services claims

Band	Redress awarded (£)	Maximum percentage	Maximum total charge (£)
1	1 to 1,499	30%	420
2	1,500 to 9,999	28%	2,500
3	10,000 to 24,999	25%	5,000
4	25,000 to 49,999	20%	7,500
5	50,000 or above	15%	10,000

Source: FCA Handbook, CMCOB 5.2.9R.1

The total charge includes expenses and any other charge under the agreement, and excludes VAT.1 Where a financial services claim falls outside the cap, a firm must not impose charges that exceed, or are capable of exceeding, an amount that is reasonable in light of the work it has done or will do.1 The FCA also strengthened the information firms must give before a contract, including how fees are calculated and the free routes to redress.14

3.4Why the FCA chose a cap

The FCA set out its reasoning in PS21/18. It said that a consumer survey it had commissioned suggested that market failures meant customers "could not effectively judge the value of services" that claims management firms provide, "and so they were vulnerable to excessive charges".10 It defined an excessive charge as one that exceeds the value provided to the individual customer, and said it "found that fees were excessive by this measure and that excessiveness was most pronounced where the amounts of redress were highest".10

The FCA tied that view to the design of the redress system. It said the ethos of that system "is that consumers should be able to make claims for free and should not need any representation".10 It considered other remedies, including disclosure rules and requiring different charging models, and decided "that imposing a fee cap was the most effective way" to meet its statutory duty.10 It assessed 13 different specifications of a banded cap, as well as product-specific caps set as a percentage of redress, a fixed amount or a combination of both.10

The FCA also recorded what it expected the cap to change in practice. It said the cap could encourage firms "to have greater regard to the merits of the claims they take on" and to compete more on price and quality of service.10 It estimated consumer benefits of around £9.6 million a year.14 That figure is the FCA's estimate at the time of the rules, not a measured result.

3.5The arguments the FCA heard against a cap

The FCA reported that feedback on the cap was mixed, with a roughly even split between respondents who agreed with it and respondents who said it was too restrictive.10 Some respondents said fees were not excessive and that consumers using a firm on a no win no fee basis "will only pay a fee if they receive redress so they can never be out-of-pocket".10 Others said the cap did not allow for the role of claims firms in "providing access to justice, particularly for vulnerable consumers", and that capped fees could reduce redress for some consumers by discouraging further work beyond a certain point.10

Those are the same arguments made for success fees in research credit work: access, no cost unless something is recovered, and an incentive to pursue the full amount. The FCA did not reject the value of claims firms. It said it wanted them to remain available and viable, and to keep "helping raise awareness of the opportunity to claim and acting as an additional check and balance on the redress system".10 It concluded that those benefits did not justify fees above the level its cap allows.

3.6What the UK cap is and is not

The UK cap limits a percentage fee. It does not prohibit one. Within each band, a firm may still charge a share of the redress up to the percentage and the cash maximum.1 It applies to consumers claiming redress, not to businesses claiming tax relief. It is described here as a record of one regulator's reasoning about fees calculated as a share of a recovery, not as a model for research credit regulation.

4The United States: the employee retention credit

4.1What the IRS said about fees

The employee retention credit was a refundable federal credit for employers during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is a different credit from the research credit, with different rules, and nothing in this section is evidence about research credit advisers. It is described because it is the most recent federal experience of a credit market in which percentage fees were common.

In September 2023 the IRS stopped processing new employee retention credit claims. Its announcement said that "a promoter can collect a contingency fee of up to 25% of the ERC refund" and reminded anyone who improperly claimed the credit that "they must pay it back, possibly with penalties and interest".15 The IRS's current list of warning signs for the credit includes "Fees based on a percentage of the refund amount of Employee Retention Credit claimed", with the advice that "you should always avoid a tax preparer basing their fee on the amount of the refund".16

In December 2023 the IRS opened a voluntary disclosure program that let employers repay 80 percent of the credit they had received. It explained: "The IRS selected an 80% repayment because many of the ERC promoters charged a percentage fee" that they collected at the time of payment or in advance, "and the recipients never received the full amount."17 Participants had to give the IRS the names, addresses and telephone numbers of any advisers or preparers who helped them.17

4.2What Congress did in 2025

Public Law 119-21, enacted on 4 July 2025, contains enforcement provisions for the employee retention credit.4 They do not ban contingent fees. Instead, they use the fee as part of the definition of who is a "COVID-ERTC promoter".

Under section 70605(b), a person who provides aid, assistance or advice with respect to an employee retention credit document is a promoter if:4

the person "charges or receives a fee for such aid, assistance, or advice which is based on the amount of the refund or credit", and its gross receipts from such work exceed 20 percent of its gross receipts for the year; or
regardless of how it charges, its gross receipts from such work exceed 50 percent of its gross receipts, or exceed both 20 percent of its gross receipts and $500,000.

A promoter that fails to comply with due diligence requirements imposed by Treasury in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, the credit is liable to a penalty of $1,000 for each failure.4 The statute says those requirements are to be similar to the due diligence requirements under section 6695(g), and the penalty applies only to documents that are, or relate to, a return or claim for refund.4

The same section barred credits or refunds after enactment unless the claim was filed by 31 January 2024, extended the period for assessing amounts attributable to the credit to six years, and extended the penalty for an excessive refund claim under section 6676 from income tax to "income or employment tax".4 The section 6676 penalty falls on "the person making such claim", which is the taxpayer.18

4.3What the federal approach shows

The 2025 statute is the clearest recent statement by Congress that a fee based on the amount of a refund or credit is a relevant marker of risk in a credit market. It did not cap or prohibit the fee. It used the fee, alongside the share of the adviser's business that came from the credit, to decide who should carry an extra due diligence duty. It did so late in the life of the credit: the same section barred new claims filed after 31 January 2024, and the promoter provisions apply only to aid, assistance and advice provided after the date of enactment.4

5Canada: disability tax credit promoters

5.1The Act

Canada's Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Act received royal assent on 29 May 2014.2 It defines a promoter as "a person who, directly or indirectly, accepts or charges a fee in respect of a disability tax credit request", and prohibits a promoter from accepting or charging a fee that exceeds the maximum fee set by regulation.2 A promoter who does so is liable to a penalty of $1,000 plus the excess fee, less any part of the fee repaid to the claimant within 120 days after the promoter notifies the Minister.2 Promoters must report fees above the maximum, and charging an excess fee is also an offence punishable by a fine of 100 to 200 percent of the excess.2

The Act was inoperative until a maximum fee was prescribed.11 It came into force on 15 November 2021, together with the regulations.23

5.2The cap

The regulations set the maximum fee at $100 for a request for a determination of disability tax credit eligibility, and $100 per taxation year for a request relating to the deduction or to any deduction or overpayment that depends on eligibility.3 If more than one request is made for a claimant for a taxation year, the total fee must not exceed $100.3 The regulations provide for the maximum to be adjusted for inflation on 1 December 2025 and every fifth year after that, if the adjustment is $5 or more.3

The fee restriction does not apply to preparing parts of a tax return that are not disability related, to unrelated tax advice, or to appeals to the Tax Court of Canada.11

5.3Why Canada acted

The regulatory impact analysis published with the regulations states the policy intent of the Act: to limit promoters' fees "to ensure that the income tax refunds generated by tax credits ... remain at the disposal of those who are entitled to them, and who need them most".11 It states that persons with disabilities and their families "have been paying what are considered excessive fees to certain promoters", and estimates that promoters collected between $9.5 million and $25.4 million for about 36,000 requests for the 2018 calendar year.11

The analysis also reports the views heard in public consultation in 2014. Participants discussed percentage fees ranging from 1 to 40 percent of the refund. It records that "many participants felt current rates (15% to 40%) are too high", while "others felt current rates are appropriate and the market would regulate itself".11 Options discussed included a maximum fee modeled on Canada's tax refund discounting rules, fixed fees, combinations of a fixed fee and a charge for each year reassessed, and maximum hourly rates.11 The government chose a flat cap.

5.4How Canada enforces it

The analysis describes the enforcement approach: the disability tax credit certificate was to collect whether a promoter helped with the request, whether a fee was charged and its amount, and a separate form was created for promoters to report excess fees.11

Canada does not cap fees for its scientific research and experimental development (SR&ED) program, but it does ask about them. The claim form guide asks for each claim preparer's name and business number and the type of billing arrangement, and tells claimants to enter code 1 for "a contingency fee as a percentage of the investment tax credit earned", together with the billing rate and the total fee.19 A penalty of $1,000 may be assessed for each SR&ED claim for which this information is missing, incomplete or inaccurate, and the claim preparer is jointly and severally liable with the claimant for it.19 This is disclosure rather than restriction. It is described in more detail on the Canada contingency fees in SR&ED page.

6Federal precedents in the United States

Federal law has limited contingent fees in claims against the government for decades. Three examples show the range of tools.

For a claim to past-due Social Security benefits, the Commissioner approves a written fee agreement only if the fee does not exceed the lesser of 25 percent of the past-due benefits or a dollar amount, and the determination is favorable to the claimant.5 The statute sets the dollar amount at $4,000 and allows the Commissioner to increase it.5 The Social Security Administration raised it to $9,200 effective 30 November 2024 and has said that cap remains in effect.20 For attorneys, the Commissioner pays the fee directly from the past-due benefits, up to 25 percent of them.5 Knowingly charging or collecting a fee above the maximum is a misdemeanor.5

6.2Veterans' benefits

For veterans' benefits, a fee generally "may not be charged, allowed, or paid" for an agent's or attorney's services provided before the claimant is notified of the initial decision on the claim.6 After that point, fee agreements must be filed with the Department of Veterans Affairs, which may reduce a fee it finds "excessive or unreasonable".6 Where the fee is contingent on a favorable result and paid directly from past-due benefits, it may not exceed 20 percent of those benefits.6

6.3Federal tort claims

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, an attorney may not charge more than 25 percent of a judgment or litigation settlement, or more than 20 percent of an administrative award, compromise or settlement.7 Charging more is punishable by a fine of up to $2,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both.7

In each of these federal schemes, Congress accepted contingent fees but limited them. And in each, a government body decides the amount before the fee is calculated: an agency determines the past-due benefits, a court enters the judgment, or the agency makes or agrees the award or settlement.567 The veterans' rule goes further by barring any fee for help with the initial claim.6

7Figure 2: how the regimes compare

Market	Who acted	Tool	Fee limit	Who decides the amount recovered
UK financial services claims	Parliament and the FCA	Banded cap; reasonableness outside the cap	15% to 30% of redress, with a cash maximum of £420 to £10,000	Firm, ombudsman or compensation scheme
UK payment protection insurance claims	Parliament	Percentage cap	20%	Not examined in this paper
US employee retention credit	Congress (2025)	Fee basis used to define promoters; due diligence penalty	None	Self-assessed by the employer; IRS on examination
Canada disability tax credit	Parliament and regulations	Flat cap; penalty; offence	$100 per request or year	Canada Revenue Agency
Canada SR&ED	Parliament and CRA	Disclosure of fee arrangement; penalty	None	Self-assessed; CRA on review
US Social Security	Congress	Cap; agency approval; direct payment	Lesser of 25% or $9,200	Social Security Administration
US veterans' benefits	Congress	No fee before initial decision; cap on direct payment	20% of past-due benefits	Department of Veterans Affairs
US federal tort claims	Congress	Criminal cap	20% or 25%	Agency or court

Sources: as cited in the text.114431952067 The table simplifies each regime for comparison and is not a complete statement of any of them.

8What the comparison shows

8.1Governments have acted on the fee structure itself

In every market described here, the government focused on how the fee was calculated, not on the conduct of any particular adviser. The FCA framed its concern as a market in which customers could not judge value.10 Canada framed its concern as fees that took money intended for people with disabilities.11 Congress, in 2025, framed its concern by reference to fees "based on the amount of the refund or credit".4 None of these measures depended on a finding that every adviser charging such a fee behaved badly, and this paper makes no such suggestion about research credit advisers.

8.2The tools range from disclosure to prohibition

The tools form a range. Canada's SR&ED rules require disclosure of the fee arrangement.19 The 2025 federal rules attach an extra duty to advisers paid on the amount of the credit.4 The UK and Social Security rules cap a percentage.15 Canada's disability tax credit rules replace a percentage with a flat amount.3 The veterans' rule bars any fee before the initial decision.6 Treasury's own rule for practitioners, in Circular 230, already sits near the prohibition end of that range for returns and refund claims, although courts have limited how far it reaches.921

8.3Caps work best where someone else fixes the base

A percentage cap limits the share of the recovery. It does not change the fact that the fee rises with the amount recovered. In the federal precedents, that matters less, because an agency or court decides or agrees the amount before the fee is calculated.567 In a self-assessed tax credit, the amount on the return is calculated by the taxpayer and its adviser.8 A cap would limit the fee on that amount, but the fee would still rise with each judgment that enlarges the claim. That is why Treasury's reasoning in 2007 focused on returns and refund claims, and why it allowed contingent fees once the IRS had begun an examination.139

8.4What the comparison does not show

This paper found no official evaluation that compares claim quality before and after any of these measures. The FCA's £9.6 million figure is a forecast of consumer benefit, not a measure of claim accuracy.14 Canada's figures describe fees collected before the cap, not claims allowed or disallowed.11 The IRS's 80 percent repayment rate reflects fees already taken from employee retention credit payouts, not a finding about how those claims were prepared.17 For the federal research credit, no IRS form records how a claim's preparer was paid, so no comparable data exists.8

9What this means for the federal research credit

The other markets show that limiting percentage fees in a claims market is an established policy choice, made by different governments with different tools. They show that the reasons given are consistent: claimants who cannot easily judge value, public money intended for the claimant, and fees that rise with the size of the recovery. They also show that a cap is a compromise suited to schemes where someone other than the adviser fixes the amount.

The research credit is a self-assessed business credit. The adviser's calculation is the amount claimed, and the IRS reviews the detail if a claim is selected for examination.1213 For that reason, the comparison points toward the tools at the stronger end of the range rather than a percentage cap.

Our position

Congress should prohibit contingent fees, commonly called success fees, in federal research and development tax credit engagements under Section 41, so that advisers are paid for the work they perform rather than for the size of the claim they produce. Swanson Reed, which publishes this paper, is a fixed-fee R&D tax adviser. It has a direct commercial interest in the outcome: it does not charge success fees, and a ban would remove a pricing model it competes against. This position concerns the federal research credit only. It is not a recommendation about the UK, Canadian or other schemes described in this paper.

References

Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, Claims Management: Conduct of Business sourcebook (CMCOB) 5.2, Fee cap for FS claims management agreements, rules CMCOB 5.2.1R, 5.2.9R, 5.2.10R and 5.2.17R (in force 1 March 2022). https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/CMCOB/5/2.html (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Act, S.C. 2014, c. 7, sections 2 to 7 and 12 and note on coming into force (consolidation current to 21 September 2026). https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/D-2.8/FullText.html (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Regulations, SOR/2021-55, sections 1 to 3 and note on coming into force (consolidation current to 21 September 2026). https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2021-55/FullText.html (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Public Law 119-21, 139 Stat. 72 (4 July 2025), section 70605, Enforcement provisions with respect to COVID-related employee retention credits, subsections (a) to (g), 139 Stat. 286 to 288. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ21/html/PLAW-119publ21.htm (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 42 U.S.C. 406, Representation of claimants before Commissioner, subsection (a)(2)(A), (a)(4) and (a)(5), United States Code 2024 edition published by the Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title42/html/USCODE-2024-title42-chap7-subchapII-sec406.htm (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 38 U.S.C. 5904, Recognition of agents and attorneys generally, subsections (c)(1) to (c)(3) and (d)(1) and (2), United States Code 2024 edition published by the Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title38/html/USCODE-2024-title38-partIV-chap59-sec5904.htm (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 28 U.S.C. 2678, Attorney fees; penalty, United States Code 2024 edition published by the Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title28/html/USCODE-2024-title28-partVI-chap171-sec2678.htm (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Internal Revenue Service, Large and Mid Size Business Division, Research Credit Claims Audit Techniques Guide (RCCATG): Credit for Increasing Research Activities Section 41, LMSB-04-0508-030 (May 2008), introductory note and Chapter II "The RC Claim Engagement Letter"; and Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 6765 (Rev. December 2025), which do not ask how a claim preparer was paid. https://www.irs.gov/businesses/research-credit-claims-audit-techniques-guide-rccatg-credit-for-increasing-research-activities-section-41 and https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i6765 (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Treasury Department, Circular No. 230, 31 CFR 10.27, Fees, paragraphs (b) and (c). https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-A/part-10/subpart-B/section-10.27 (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Financial Conduct Authority, PS21/18: Restricting CMC charges for financial products and services claims, Policy Statement (November 2021), paragraphs 1.3, 1.4, 1.9 to 1.13, 2.4 to 2.10 and 2.16 to 2.19. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps21-18.pdf (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Government of Canada, Disability Tax Credit Promoters Restrictions Regulations: SOR/2021-55, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Canada Gazette, Part II, Volume 155, Number 8 (14 April 2021), sections "Executive summary", "Issues", "Background", "Description", "Consultation" and "Compliance and enforcement". https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2021/2021-04-14/html/sor-dors55-eng.html (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Internal Revenue Service, Research credit claims (Section 41) on amended returns frequently asked questions, introduction and questions 4 and 21 (page last reviewed or updated 1 October 2026). https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/research-credit-claims-section-41-on-amended-returns-frequently-asked-questions (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, final regulations, T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54540 (26 September 2007), preamble, "Contingent Fees", pages 54541 to 54542. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2007/09/26/E7-18918/regulations-governing-practice-before-the-internal-revenue-service (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Financial Conduct Authority, FCA launches claims management companies fees cap, press release, 1 March 2022. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-launches-claims-management-companies-fees-cap (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
Internal Revenue Service, To protect taxpayers from scams, IRS orders immediate stop to new Employee Retention Credit processing amid surge of questionable claims, News release IR-2023-169, 14 September 2023. https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/to-protect-taxpayers-from-scams-irs-orders-immediate-stop-to-new-employee-retention-credit-processing-amid-surge-of-questionable-claims-concerns-from-tax-pros (accessed 11 October 2026). Back
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Cite this paper

Summary

1Summary

2Why look at other claims markets

2.1What the markets have in common

2.2Where the analogy stops

3The United Kingdom: claims management fee caps

3.1Regulation and the statutory duty

3.2The cap

3.3Figure 1: the UK fee cap for financial services claims

3.4Why the FCA chose a cap

3.5The arguments the FCA heard against a cap

3.6What the UK cap is and is not

4The United States: the employee retention credit

4.1What the IRS said about fees

4.2What Congress did in 2025

4.3What the federal approach shows

5Canada: disability tax credit promoters

5.1The Act

5.2The cap

5.3Why Canada acted

5.4How Canada enforces it

6Federal precedents in the United States

6.2Veterans' benefits

6.3Federal tort claims

7Figure 2: how the regimes compare

8What the comparison shows

8.1Governments have acted on the fee structure itself

8.2The tools range from disclosure to prohibition

8.3Caps work best where someone else fixes the base

8.4What the comparison does not show

9What this means for the federal research credit

References

About this paper

Cite this paper

Summary

1Summary

2Why look at other claims markets

2.1What the markets have in common

2.2Where the analogy stops

3The United Kingdom: claims management fee caps

3.1Regulation and the statutory duty

3.2The cap

3.3Figure 1: the UK fee cap for financial services claims

3.4Why the FCA chose a cap

3.5The arguments the FCA heard against a cap

3.6What the UK cap is and is not

4The United States: the employee retention credit

4.1What the IRS said about fees

4.2What Congress did in 2025

4.3What the federal approach shows

5Canada: disability tax credit promoters

5.1The Act

5.2The cap

5.3Why Canada acted

5.4How Canada enforces it

5.5A related Canadian practice: disclosure in SR&ED claims

6Federal precedents in the United States

6.1Social Security benefits

6.2Veterans' benefits

6.3Federal tort claims

6.4What the precedents share

7Figure 2: how the regimes compare

8What the comparison shows

8.1Governments have acted on the fee structure itself

8.2The tools range from disclosure to prohibition

8.3Caps work best where someone else fixes the base

8.4What the comparison does not show

9What this means for the federal research credit

References

About this paper

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